Example 1

The insured received a fraudulent email they thought was from their contractor providing a new account number to send a payment to. Using the new account number, the insured sent an ACH payment of approximately $800,000. The contractor contacted the insured when they didn’t receive the payment. The payment had cleared from the insured’s account which led both parties to realize the funds had been misrouted.

The initial payment was issued on a Friday. It cleared the insured’s account on the following Monday. The insured and contractor figured out the funds were sent to a fraudulent account on Tuesday and the bank was immediately notified. Luckily the bank was able to recover the funds since the were notified so quickly.

Example 2

The insured was emailing with a vendor on mailing their payment to a PO Box vs the vendor’s street address as road constructing was delaying delivery. Shortly after agreeing to mail the payment to a PO Box, the insured received another email asking the insured to instead wire to money to speed up the process. The email asking for a wire was fraudulent. The string of emails between the vendor and our insured was somehow infiltrated. One letter in the email address of the vendor was changed and the insured did not catch it. The payment in question was almost $300,000.

It took several months, but the bank was able to recover the funds.